Virtual Workshop on Merger Control and Theories of Harm

From November 22nd to 24th, a three-day virtual workshop on merger control took place, centering on horizontal theories of harm and their underlying competition economics. Organized by the OECD/KPC Competition Programme, the event delved into investigative tools and economic methodologies for analyzing competitive effects.

The workshop's first day commenced with opening remarks by Mr. Jungwon Song, Director General of the OECD/KPC Competition Programme, and Mr. Ruben Maximiano, Senior Expert and Regional Manager for Asia-Pacific at OECD. Mr. Maximiano provided an overview of the main theories of harm in horizontal cases, including unilateral and coordinated effects, and explained the types of evidence used to inform these theories.

Day two featured case studies from various jurisdictions. Mr. Ethan Stevenson, a trial attorney in the US DOJ Antitrust Division, shared insights on the recently challenged Penguin Random House/Schuster merger. The discussion revolved around the adaptation of economic tools for analyzing upstream harm scenarios. Mr. Apostolos Baltzopoulos from the European Commission discussed the cleared Danfoss/Eaton Hydraulics merger, emphasizing the significance of CRM data in analyzing market shares and potential competition.

On the final day, participants engaged in a hypothetical merger case in the telecoms sector, followed by a session led by Mr. Vipul Puri from the Competition Commission of India and Atty. Michael Herrera, the Division Chief for the Merger Review Division.

The workshop concluded with closing remarks from Mr. Maximiano and Mr. Song, providing attendees with valuable insights into horizontal merger control and its economic implications.